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Zero-sum Polymatrix Games: A Generalization of Minmax
Yang Cai∗ Ozan Candogan† Constantinos Daskalakis‡ Christos Papadimitriou§
Abstract
We show that in zero-sum polymatrix games, a multiplayer generalization of two-person zero-
sum games, Nash equilibria can be found efficiently with linear programming. We also show that
the set of coarse correlated equilibria collapses to the set of Nash equilibria. In contrast, other
important properties of two-person zero-sum games are not preserved: Nash equilibrium payoffs
need not be unique, and Nash equilibrium strategies need not be exchangeable or max-min.
1 Introduction
According to Robert Aumann [Aum87], two-person zero-sum games1 are “one of the few areas in
game theory, and indeed in the social sciences, where a fairly sharp, unique prediction is made.”
Indeed, in a two-person zero-sum game, max-min strategies offer a rather compelling solution:
They constitute a Nash equilibrium, and this Nash equilibrium is unique modulo degeneracy. Fur-
thermore, these mixed strategies can be easily computed with linear programming. In contrast,
we now know that Nash equilibria are hard to compute in general, even for two-person non-zero-
sum games [DGP06, CDT06]—and consequently for three-person zero-sum games. Von Neumann’s
minmax theorem [Neu28] seems to have very narrow applicability.
In this note we prove a multi-player generalization of the minmax theorem. We show that
for any multi-player polymatrix game that is zero-sum the Nash equilibrium can be easily found
by linear programming (and in fact by a quite direct generalization of the linear programming
formulation of two-person zero-sum games). Informally, a polymatrix game (or separable network
game) is defined by a graph. The nodes of the graph are the players, and the edges of the graph are
two-person games. Every node has a fixed set of strategies, and chooses a strategy from this set to
play in all games corresponding to adjacent edges. Given a strategy profile of all the players, the
node’s payoff is the sum of its payoffs in all games on edges adjacent to it. The game is zero-sum
if, for all strategy profiles, the payoffs of all players add up to zero. This is the class of games
we are considering; we present a simple method, based on linear programming, for finding a Nash
equilibrium in such games (Theorem 2).
Zero-sum polymatrix games can model common situations in which nodes in a network interact
pairwise and make decisions (for example, adopt one of many technologies, or choose one or more
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1Actually, Aumann makes the statement for (two-person) strictly competitive games; but these were recently shown
to essentially coincide with two-person zero-sum games [ADP09].
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of their neighbors for preferential interaction), and which is a closed system of payoffs, in that it
is impossible for payoffs to flow in or out of the system. It is an intriguing class of games: since
the definition involves a universal quantification over all strategy profiles, an exponential set, it is
not a priori clear that there is an efficient algorithm for recognizing such games (but there is, see
Section 4).
One immediate way to obtain such a game is to create a polymatrix game in which all edge-
games are zero-sum, see [BF87, BF98, DP09]. But there are other ways:
Example 1. Consider the security game between several evaders and several inspectors (these are
the players) with many exit points (these are the strategies); each exit point is within the jurisdiction
of one inspector. The network is a complete bipartite graph between evaders and inspectors. Each
evader can choose any exit point, and each inspector can choose one exit point in her jurisdiction.
For every evader whose exit point is inspected, the corresponding inspector wins one unit of payoff.
If the evader’s exit point is not inspected, the evader wins one unit. All other payoffs are zero.
This simple polymatrix game is not zero-sum, but it is constant-sum: It is easy to see that, for
any strategy profile, the total payoff equals the number of evaders. Thus it can be turned into zero-
sum by, say, subtracting this amount from the payoffs of any player. But the resulting zero-sum
polymatrix game has constituent games which are not zero- or constant- sum. In other words, the
zero-sum nature of this game is a global, rather than a local, property. See Section 4 for further
discussion of this point.
2 The Main Result
We first define zero-sum polymatrix games formally.
Definition 1. A polymatrix game, or separable network game G consists of the following:
• a finite set V = {1, . . . , n} of players, sometimes called nodes, and a finite set E of edges,
which are taken to be unordered pairs [i, j] of players, i 6= j;
• for each player i ∈ V , a finite set of strategies Si;
• for each edge [i, j] ∈ E, a two-person game (pij , pji) where the players are i, j, the strategy
sets Si, Sj, respectively, and the payoffs p
ij : Si × Sj 7→ R, and similarly for pji;
• for each player i ∈ V and strategy profile s¯ = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈
∏
j∈V Sj, the payoff of player i
under s¯ is pi(s¯) =
∑
[i,j]∈E p
ij(si, sj).
Furthermore, G is zero-sum if for all strategy profiles s¯ = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈
∏
j∈V Sj,
∑
i∈V pi(s¯) = 0.
Fix a zero-sum polymatrix game G. We shall next formulate a linear program which captures
G. The variables are the mixed strategies of the players, so we have a probability xsi for all i ∈ V
and s ∈ Si. We denote the vector of all these variables by x so that x encodes a mixed strategy
profile. We require that xsi ≥ 0, for all i and s, and
∑
s∈Si x
s
i = 1, for all i, writing x ∈ ∆, if x
satisfies these constraints.
For x ∈ ∆, we write xi for the mixed strategy of player i and x−i ∈ ∆−i for the vector of
mixed strategies of all players but player i, where ∆−i denotes the set of all possible x−i’s. We
sometimes write (xi, x−i) for x, and (s, x−i) for the mixed strategy profile x such that xsi = 1,
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i.e., xi corresponds to the pure strategy s ∈ Si. Moreover, we extend pi(·) to mixed strategies by
taking expectations. Namely,
pi(x) :=
∑
[i,j]∈E
∑
si∈Si,sj∈Sj
pij(si, sj)x
si
i x
sj
j
represents the expected payoff of player i under mixed strategy profile x. Similarly, for s ∈ Si,
pj(s, x−i) represents the expected payoff of player j when player i uses pure strategy s and the
other players use their mixed strategies in x−i.
For each player i, player i’s payoff pi(s, x−i) from a pure strategy s in Si is obviously a linear
function of x−i. Consider the following linear program in the variables y ∈ ∆ and w := (w1, ..., wn):
LP 1 :
min
y,w
∑
i∈V
wi
subject to wi ≥ pi(s, y−i), for all i ∈ V, s ∈ Si,
y ∈ ∆.
We next state our main result:
Theorem 2. If (y, w) is an optimal solution to LP 1, then y is a Nash equilibrium of G. Conversely,
if y is a Nash equilibrium of G, then there is a w such that (y, w) is an optimal solution to LP 1.
We give two proofs of this theorem; the first relies on Nash’s theorem, whereas, the second only
employs linear programming duality.
Proof using Nash’s Theorem
The constraints of LP 1 imply that at any feasible solution (y, w) we have wi ≥ maxs∈Si pi(s, y−i).
Moreover, since pi(xi, y−i) is linear in xi, it follows that∑
i∈V
max
s∈Si
pi(s, y−i) = max
x∈∆
∑
i∈V
pi(xi, y−i). (1)
Note that zero-sum property implies that
∑
i∈V pi(y) = 0 for any y ∈ ∆. Using this observation
together with (1) and the constraint wi ≥ maxs∈Si pi(s, y−i) implies that at feasible solution (y, w)
we have ∑
i∈V
wi ≥
∑
i∈V
max
s∈Si
pi(s, y−i) = max
x∈∆
∑
i
pi(xi, y−i) ≥
∑
i∈V
pi(yi, y−i) = 0. (2)
Hence the optimal objective of the linear program is lower bounded by zero. Nash’s theorem implies
that there exists a Nash equilibrium y∗ such that
max
s∈Si
pi(s, y
∗
−i)− pi(y∗i , y∗−i) = 0. (3)
Setting wi = maxs∈Si pi(s, y∗−i) it can be seen that (y
∗, w) is a feasible solution to LP 1, and (3)
implies that all inequalities in (2) hold with equality for this solution, and the objective value zero
is achieved in LP 1 so that (y∗, w) is an optimal solution. For the forward direction, consider any
optimal solution (w, y) of LP 1. Since the objective value is
∑
i∈V wi = 0 in this solution, it follows
from (2) that (3) holds for this optimal solution, and hence y is a Nash equilibrium.
3
Proof using linear programming duality
In the above proof we use Nash’s theorem to conclude that the optimal objective value of LP 1 is
equal to zero. It would be surprising if the power of Nash’s theorem were necessary to establish a
property of a linear program. We show that it is not.
Let us rewrite the constraints of LP 1 with the help of a square matrix R with
∑
i |Si| rows and
columns. The rows and columns of R are indexed by pairs (i : s) and (j : r) for i, j ∈ V and s ∈ Si,
r ∈ Sj , and R(i:s),(j:r) = pij(s, r) if [i, j] ∈ E, R(i:s),(j:r) = 0 otherwise. Then pi(s, y−i) in LP 1
corresponds to the row (Ry)(i:s) of Ry indexed by (i : s) for i ∈ V , s ∈ Si, and
∑
i∈V pi(xi, y−i) =
xTRy = yTRTx for x, y ∈ ∆. This observation suggests that LP 1 can be reformulated by replacing
the constraint wi ≥ pi(s, y−i) with wi ≥ (Ry)(i:s). Thus, the dual of LP 1 (referred to as DLP 1)
can be stated using the decision variables z ∈ ∆ and v := (v1, ..., vn) as follows:
DLP 1 :
max
z,v
∑
j∈V
vj
subject to vj ≤ (RT z)(j:r), for all j ∈ V, r ∈ Sj ,
z ∈ ∆.
Similar to LP 1, it can be seen that a feasible solution (z, v) of DLP 1 satisfies∑
j∈V
vj ≤
∑
j∈V
min
r∈Sj
(RT z)(j,r) = min
x∈∆
xTRT z ≤ zTRT z = 0, (4)
where the first equality follows from the linearity of xTRT z in x, and the last one follows from the
zero-sum property. So the optimal objective value of DLP 1 is bounded above by zero. Through
strong duality this implies that the optimal objective value of LP 1 is bounded above by zero. Since
the optimal value of LP 1 is also lower bounded by zero, it follows that LP 1 has value zero, which
is what we needed to avoid the use of Nash’s theorem in our previous proof of Theorem 2.
Remark: Interestingly, if (z, v) is an optimal solution to DLP 1, then z is also a Nash equilibrium.
This can be seen by noting that by strong duality the optimal objective value of the dual is equal
to zero, and hence (4) implies that
∑
j∈V minr∈Sj (R
T z)(j,r) = z
TRT z = zTRz = 0 at this solution.
Hence, zj assigns positive probability only to entries of (Rz)(j:r) that are minimal. The definition
of R implies that for any r this entry is given by
∑
i∈V,s∈Si,[i,j]∈E z
s
i p
ij(s, r), i.e., the sum of payoffs
of neighbors of player j that play against her. Since the game is zero-sum, minimizing this quantity
maximizes the payoff of player j, and hence zj is her best response to z−j .
3 Properties of zero-sum polymatrix games
Thus in zero-sum polymatrix games a Nash equilibrium can be found by linear programming, just
as in zero-sum two-person games. One immediate question that comes to mind is, which of the
many other strong properties of zero-sum two-person games also generalize to zero-sum polymatrix
games? We consider the following properties of zero-sum two-person games:
(i) Each player has a unique payoff value in all Nash equilibria, known as her value in the game.
(ii) Equilibrium strategies are max-min strategies, i.e., each player uses a strategy that maximizes
her worst-case payoff (with respect to her opponent’s strategies).
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(iii) Equilibrium strategies are exchangeable, i.e., if (x1, x2) and (y1, y2) are equilibria, then so are
(x1, y2) and (y1, x2). In particular, the set of equilibrium strategies of each player is convex,
and the set of equilibria is the corresponding product set.
(iv) There are no correlated equilibria (or even coarse correlated equilibria, see definition below)
whose marginals with respect to the players do not constitute a Nash equilibrium.
As we shall see next, only one of these four properties (namely, (iv)) generalizes to zero-sum
polymatrix games. Moreover, Property (iii) is partially true; namely the set of equilibrium strategies
of each player is convex, but it is not necessarily true anymore that the set of equilibria is the
corresponding product set.
Value of a Player. Does every player in a zero-sum polymatrix game have a value, attained at
all equilibria? Consider three players a, b, c. Player a has a single strategy H, whereas players b, c
have two strategies H,T (for “heads” and “tails”). The polymatrix game involves two edges: an
edge between players a and b, and another edge between b and c. The payoffs are as follows:
[a,b]: If player a chooses the same strategy as player b, player a receives 1 and player b receives −1,
otherwise player a receives −1 and player b receives 1.
[b,c]: If player b chooses the same strategy as player c, player b receives 1 and player c receives −1,
otherwise player b receives −1 and player c receives 1.
It is straightforward to check that this game is a zero-sum polymatrix game, and the following two
strategy profiles are Nash equilibria with different player payoffs:
(i) (H,T,H), i.e., player b chooses T , while players a, c choose H. The payoffs of the players are
(−1, 0, 1). To see that this is an equilibrium, note first that in our game player a only has
a single strategy (H). Hence, for trivial reasons she cannot deviate to improve her payoff.
Player c maximizes her payoff by choosing a strategy different from the one chosen by b, so
she has no incentive to deviate from her strategy in this profile. Finally, given that a and c
use strategy H, the payoff of b is equal to zero from both strategies, so she is best responding
by playing T . Hence, (H,T,H) is an equilibrium.
(ii) (H, 1/2(H) + 1/2(T ), H), i.e., player b uniformly mixes between her strategies, while players
a, c choose H. The payoffs of the players are now (0, 0, 0). Seeing that this profile is an
equilibrium is as straightforward as in (i).
Hence, different equilibria assign different payoffs to players in zero-sum polymatrix games.
Max-min strategies. For games with more than two players, a max-min strategy of a player is
a strategy that maximizes her worst-case payoff, for any strategies of her opponents. In the game
of the previous paragraph, the max-min strategy of player c is given by 1/2(H)+1/2(T ). However,
we saw that there are Nash equilibria in which c uses a different mixed strategy. Moreover, there
are no Nash equilibria in which c uses her max-min strategy. To see this, note that when c uses
the aforementioned strategy (and because a only has a single strategy, H) player b maximizes her
payoff by using strategy T . On the other hand, if player b uses this strategy, player c can improve
her payoff by deviating from her max-min strategy to H.
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Exchangeability. Exchangeability can be naturally generalized to multi-player games (with a
set of players V = {1, . . . , n}) as follows: If {xi}i∈V and {yi}i∈V are Nash equilibria, then so is the
strategy profile (x1, . . . , xi−1, yi, xi+1, . . . xn). To disprove this property for zero-sum polymatrix
games, let us consider a game with three players, a, b and c, two strategies, H and T , available
to each player, and three edges: [a, b], [b, c], and [a, c]. The payoffs associated with each edge are
the same as the payoffs of the matching-pennies game (see Figure 1). We assume that the row
H T
H 1,-1 -1,1
T -1,1 1,-1
Figure 1: Payoffs in a matching-pennies game.
players associated with edges [a, b], [b, c], and [a, c] are respectively a, b, and c. It can be seen that
this is a zero-sum polymatrix game, and two Nash equilibria of this game are (i) (H,H,H), and
(ii) (T, T, T ). On the other hand, (T,H,H) is not an equilibrium strategy, since the third player
receives a payoff of −2 in this strategy profile, but she can improve her payoff to 2 by deviating
to T . Note that this example also shows that the set of mixed strategy profiles that are equilibria
cannot be expressed as a product of the sets of strategies that players use at equilibrium.2
Correlated equilibria. Recall the definition of correlated equilibrium, and the more general
concept of coarse correlated equilibrium (see, e.g., [MV78, CBL06]):
Definition 3. Let S = Πi∈V Si and z ∈ ∆(S) be a distribution over pure strategy profiles, where
z(s¯) denotes the probability of pure strategy profile s¯ ∈ S. z is a correlated equilibrium iff for every
player i and strategies r, t ∈ Si,∑
s¯−i∈S−i
pi(r, s¯−i) · z(r,s¯−i) ≥
∑
s¯−i∈S−i
pi(t, s¯−i) · z(r,s¯−i). (5)
z is a coarse correlated equilibrium iff for every player i and strategy t ∈ Si,∑
s¯∈S
pi(s¯) · z(s¯) ≥
∑
s¯−i∈S−i
pi(t, s¯−i) · z(s¯−i)−i , (6)
where z
(s¯−i)
−i =
∑
r∈Si z
(r,s¯−i) is the marginal probability that the pure strategy profile sampled by z
for players V \ {i} is s¯−i.3
Theorem 4. If z is a coarse correlated equilibrium then xˆ is a Nash equilibrium, where, for every
player i, xˆi is the marginal probability distribution: xˆ
r
i =
∑
s¯−i∈S−i z
(r,s¯−i), for all r ∈ Si.
Proof. Since the game is polymatrix, pi(r, xˆ−i) =
∑
s¯−i∈S−i pi(r, s¯−i) · z
(s¯−i)
−i for all i and r ∈ Si.
Indeed, the LHS is player i’s expected payoff from strategy r when the other players use mixed
strategies xˆ−i, while the RHS is i’s expected payoff from strategy r when the other players’ strategies
are jointly sampled from z
(·)
−i. The equality follows from the fact that xˆ−i and z
(·)
−i have the same
2Since the set of optimal solutions of linear programs is convex, Theorem 2 implies that set of mixed strategy
profiles that are equilibria is convex. However, lack of exchangability implies that this convex set is not a product
set of strategies of different players.
3Observe that (6) follows by summing (5) over r ∈ Si. Hence, if z is a correlated equilibrium, then z is also a
coarse correlated equilibrium.
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marginal distributions with respect to the strategy of each player in V \ {i}, and i’s payoff only
depends on these marginals. Now, let w∗i =
∑
s¯∈S pi(s¯) · z(s¯). Because z is a coarse correlated
equilibrium, w∗i ≥ pi(r, xˆ−i) for any r ∈ Si. On the other hand,
∑
iw
∗
i = 0 since the game is
zero-sum. These imply that (xˆ, w∗) is an optimal solution to LP1, so that xˆ is a Nash equilibrium
by Theorem 2.
This result has an interesting algorithmic consequence, which complements Theorem 2. The
Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum polymatrix game G can be found not only with linear programming,
but can also be arrived at in a distributed manner, as long as the players run an arbitrary no-regret
learning algorithm [CBL06, FS99] to update their strategies in a repeated game with stage game G.
The players’ average strategies can be shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium of G [CD11].
4 A Transformation
A special case of zero-sum polymatrix games are the pairwise constant-sum polymatrix games in
which every edge is a two-person constant-sum game, and all these constants add up to zero.
Superficially, zero-sum polymatrix games appear to be more general. In this section we prove that
they are not, by presenting a payoff-preserving transformation from any zero-sum polymatrix game
to a pairwise constant-sum polymatrix game.
Payoff Preserving Transformation: We transform a zero-sum polymatrix game G to a pairwise
constant-sum polymatrix game Gˆ by modifying the payoff functions on the edges. For every edge
[i, j], we construct a new two player game (pˆij , pˆji) based on (pij , pji). For simplicity, we use 1 to
denote the first strategy in every player’s strategy set. The new payoffs are defined as follows:
pˆij(r, s) : = pij(1, s) + pji(s, 1)− pji(s, r). (7)
Notice that pˆij(1, 1) = pij(1, 1).
Before we argue that (pˆij , pˆji) is a constant sum game, we need to prove some useful local
properties of (pij , pji).
Lemma 5. For any edge [i, j] and any r ∈ Si, s ∈ Sj, we have
pij(1, 1) + pji(1, 1) + pij(r, s) + pji(s, r) = pij(1, s) + pji(s, 1) + pij(r, 1) + pji(1, r). (8)
Proof. Let all players except i and j fix their strategies, and −α represent the sum of all players’
payoffs from edges that do not involve i or j as one of their endpoints. Let P(k:t) (k in {i, j}) be
the sum of payoffs of k and her neighbors from all edges incident to k except [i, j], when k plays
strategy t. Since the game is zero-sum, the following are true:
• i plays strategy 1, j plays strategy s: P(i:1) + P(j:s) + pij(1, s) + pji(s, 1) = α (a)
• i plays strategy r, j plays strategy 1: P(i:r) + P(j:1) + pij(r, 1) + pji(1, r) = α (b)
• i plays strategy 1, j plays strategy 1: P(i:1) + P(j:1) + pij(1, 1) + pji(1, 1) = α (c)
• i plays strategy r, j plays strategy s: P(i:r) + P(j:s) + pij(r, s) + pji(s, r) = α (d)
Clearly, we have (a) + (b) = (c) + (d). By canceling out the common terms, we obtain the
desired equality.
Next, we show that when G is zero-sum, Gˆ is a pairwise constant sum game.
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Lemma 6. For every edge [i, j], for all r ∈ Si, s ∈ Sj, pˆij(r, s) + pˆji(s, r) = Cij, where Cij :=
pij(1, 1) + pji(1, 1) is an absolute constant that does not depend on r, s.
Proof. From the definition of pˆij(r, s) (see (7)) we have
pˆij(r, s) + pˆji(s, r) =
(
pij(1, s) + pji(s, 1)− pji(s, r))+ (pji(1, r) + pij(r, 1)− pij(r, s)) .
Using Lemma 5, this equality can be alternatively expressed as
pˆij(r, s) + pˆji(s, r) = pij(1, 1) + pji(1, 1) + pij(r, s) + pji(s, r)− pji(s, r)− pij(r, s)
= pij(1, 1) + pji(1, 1).
The result follows from the definition of Cij .
Finally, we prove that the transformation preserves the payoff of every player.
Theorem 7. For every pure strategy profile, every player has the same payoff in games G and Gˆ.
Proof. To prove this claim, we first use Lemma 6 to establish that Gˆ is zero-sum. Consider any
strategy profile s¯ in Gˆ. Observe that∑
i∈V
pˆi(s¯) =
∑
i∈V
∑
[i,j]∈E
pˆij(si, sj)
=
∑
[i,j]∈E
pˆij(si, sj) + pˆ
ji(sj , si)
=
∑
[i,j]∈E
pij(1, 1) + pji(1, 1)
= 0,
where the third equality follows from Lemma 6, and the last one follows from the fact that the
quantity
∑
[i,j]∈E p
ij(1, 1)+pji(1, 1) equals the sum of all players’ payoffs in zero-sum game G when
all players use their first strategy.
We next complete the proof by using the following consequence of Lemma 5 and (7):
pˆij(r, s) = pij(1, s) + pji(s, 1)− pji(s, r)
= pij(1, 1) + pji(1, 1) + pij(r, s)− pji(1, r)− pij(r, 1). (9)
Note that this alternative representation of pˆij(r, s) immediately implies that for any pair of strate-
gies s, t ∈ Sj :
pˆij(r, s)− pˆij(r, t) = pij(r, s)− pij(r, t). (10)
Now consider an arbitrary pure strategy profile, and suppose that some player j changes her
strategy from s to t. If some other player i is not a neighbor of j, then i’s payoff does not change as
a result of j’s change of strategy. If player i is a neighbor of j, and plays r, then due to j’s change of
strategy, the change in i’s payoff in G equals pij(r, s)−pij(r, t), while in Gˆ it equals pˆij(r, s)−pˆij(r, t).
Thus, (10) implies that the payoff change experienced by neighbors of j is identical in both games.
Hence, if every player has the same payoff in G and Gˆ before j changes her strategy, every player
other than j still has the same payoff in the two games after j changes her strategy. Finally, since
both games are zero-sum, j’s payoff is also the same in the two games after the change.
Consider the strategy profile where all players play 1. Since pˆij(1, 1) = pij(1, 1) (from (7)), it
follows that every player has the same payoff in G and Gˆ in this profile. Given a target strategy
profile, start from the all 1’s strategy profile and successively change the strategy of every player to
match the target profile (one player at a time). By the argument above, after every change, every
player has the same payoff in G and Gˆ. Thus, the claim follows.
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An algorithm for recognizing zero-sum polymatrix games
Our main result in this paper states that Nash equilibria in zero-sum polymatrix games can be
computed through linear programming, just like in two-person zero-sum games. However, it is not
a priori clear that, if such a game is presented to us, we can recognize it, since the definition of a
zero-sum polymatrix game involves a universal quantification over all pure strategy profiles (which
scale exponentially with the number of players).
Note that Lemma 5 provides a necessary condition that zero-sum polymatrix games satisfy.
Similarly, Lemma 6 indicates that the transformation of zero-sum polymatrix games provided by
(7) will have a pairwise constant-sum structure that is easy to check. However, these conditions are
not sufficient, i.e., not all games that satisfy the condition of Lemma 5, or whose transformations
have the pairwise constant-sum structure, are zero-sum polymatrix games. For instance, consider
the game given on the left in Figure 2. This game can be viewed as a polymatrix game with two
players connected by an edge. Observe that the payoffs satisfy the condition provided in Lemma
5, but the game is not zero-sum. Similarly, the transformation of this game (given on the right in
Figure 2) is constant-sum (in fact zero-sum), despite the fact that the original game is not zero-sum.
A B
A 0,0 -3,0
B 1,2 0,0
A B
A 0,0 -3,3
B -2,2 -3,3
Figure 2: Consider a two-player game, where players have two strategies A,B (left), and the
corresponding transformed game (right).
We next show that, even though the aforementioned simple conditions are not applicable, there
exists an efficient algorithm that can be used to recognize zero-sum polymatrix games.
Theorem 8. Let G be a polymatrix game. For any player i, s ∈ Si, and x−i ∈ ∆−i, denote by
W (s, x−i) :=
∑
j∈V pj(s, x−i) the sum of all players’ payoffs when i plays s and all other players
play x−i. G is a constant-sum game if and only if the optimal objective value of
max
x−i∈∆−i
W (r, x−i)−W (s, x−i) (11)
equals zero for all i ∈ V and r, s ∈ Si. Moreover, this condition can be checked in polynomial time
(in the number of strategies and players).
Proof. A polymatrix game is constant-sum if and only if changing a single player’s strategy in a
strategy profile does not affect the sum of all players’ payoffs. Equivalently, a game is constant-sum
if and only if for all i ∈ V , r, s ∈ Si, and x−i ∈ ∆−i, W (r, x−i) = W (s, x−i). Observe that if
the latter condition holds, then the optimal objective value of (11) equals zero, for all i ∈ V and
r, s ∈ Si. Moreover, if the optimal objective value of (11) equals zero for all i ∈ V and r, s ∈ Si,
then W (r, x−i) = W (s, x−i) for all i ∈ V and r, s ∈ Si. Thus, G is a zero-sum polymatrix game if
and only if (11) has objective value zero, for all i ∈ V and r, s ∈ Si.
Notice that the objective function of (11) is a linear function of x−i since G is a polymatrix
game, and all payoffs on edges not adjacent to player i cancel out when we take the difference.
Moreover, the constraint x−i ∈ ∆−i is linear, since ∆−i is a product space of simplices. Thus, (11)
is a linear optimization problem, and by solving (11) for all i ∈ V and r, s ∈ Si, it is possible to
check in polynomial time whether G is a constant-sum polymatrix game.
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Our theorem implies that by solving the optimization problem in (11) for all i ∈ V and r, s ∈ Si,
it is possible to check if a polymatrix game is constant-sum. Moreover, if the game is constant-sum,
by evaluating W at an arbitrary strategy profile it is possible to check if the game is zero-sum.
5 Discussion
Our main result is a generalization of von Neumann’s minmax theorem from two-person zero-sum
games to zero-sum polymatrix games. We also showed that several other properties of two-person
zero-sum games fail to generalize to polymatrix games, with one exception: Coarse correlated
equilibria collapse to Nash equilibria, and no-regret play converges to Nash equilibrium.
How extensive is the class of zero-sum polymatrix games? We noted in the introduction that
it trivially includes all polymatrix games with zero-sum edges, but also other games, such as the
security game, for which the zero-sum property seems to be of a “global” nature. However, the
results of the last section imply that any zero-sum polymatrix game can be transformed, through
a nontrivial transformation, into a payoff-equivalent polymatrix game with constant-sum edges.
Whether there are further generalizations of the minmax theorem to more general classes of games
is an important open problem. Another interesting direction involves understanding the classes
of games that are strategically equivalent (e.g., in the sense formalized in [MV78]) to zero-sum
polymatrix games.
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